To appreciate the rationale behind the argumentation in these articles, one needs to know something of the genesis of the Pope's philosophical thinking as set forth in some of his earlier publications. I will attempt in the following essay to provide a brief summary of that necessary background, followed by a detailed analysis of these two important articles, concluding with several personal comments and questions of an evaluative nature.
attractive was Scheler's insistence upon objectivity in ethics and his endeavor to create a system of objective values. Studying and teaching at the University of Krakow, Wojtyla was consistently confronted by seientism and empiricism in virtually every sphere of intellectual endeavor in Poland. The positivism represented by the Polish school of logic reduced to the empirical all that was human. 5 Wojtyla recognized clearly that an epistemology which limits all intelligible reality to matters of fact and measurable data inexorably leads to skepticism and ethical relativism. Scheler appeared to offer an alternative with an ethics of "rigid ethical absolutism and objectivism." 6 Wojtyla insists in his thesis on Scheler that, to interpret the moral data of Christian revelation adequately, a philosophical ethics must be able to determine acts as good or evil in themselves. Although Scheler's system includes some objective tendencies, its objectivity breaks down, Wojtyla contends, because of its phenomenological principles; good and evil only "appear" as phenomena of intentional feelings. Scheler's "emotional intuitionism" considers values in isolation from the context of human action; Wojtyla rejects it as unable to determine acts as good or evil in themselves. For moral values to be real and objective, they must be based on principles that are "meta-phenomenological, or, frankly, meta-physical." 7 Although Scheler's phenomenological and emotionalistic principles do not suffice for a scientific interpretation of Christian ethics, Scheler's system can be "accidentally helpful" for Christian ethics, Wojtyla admitted, insofar as it "facilitates the analysis of ethical facts on the plane of phenomena and experience." 8 Phenomenology permits us to penetrate into the ethical experience of the believing Christian and observe the pattern discernible there. But it plays no more than a "secondary and auxiliary role." "Our investigation convinces us that a Christian thinker, especially a theologian using phenomenological experience in his work, may not be a phenomenologist." 9 One may not dispense with metaphysics. By analyzing consciousness, one cannot penetrate into the objective moral order, and that is something no Catholic thinker may relinquish.
For the very reasons he rejected the phenomenology of Max Scheler, Wojtyla espoused the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. 10 
"THE PROBLEM OF EXPERIENCE IN ETHICS"
In his article on "The Problem of Experience in Ethics," Wojtyla describes ethics today as existing in a "critical" situation of divergence (267). When questioned on the nature of their science, ethicians do not give a single, unambiguous answer. Some, like the logical positiviste, deny that ethics is a science at all. At the basis of this disagreement lies the dissolution of the original unity of science into a multiplicity of special sciences, each with its own criteria. The Cardinal points to two main streams of thought regarding the criteria for a science. The first, empiricism, limits the basis for science not only to the realm of experience but to the "purely sensible." The second, "rationalistic apriorism," takes "first theorems" as its point of departure and the source of its certitude; these first theorems are said to lie not in experience but unconditionally in the understanding, directly and immediately apparent (268).
This divergence in epistemology explains the divergence in contemporary ethics. Should ethics be an empirical-inductive science or one that is aprioristic-deductive? Empiricists examine and describe moral phenomena in individual, psychic, or social life. The result is a psychology or sociology of morals, but not ethics. The apriorists collect norms and, using the deductive method, organize them into a "logic of norms." But they too fail to raise the essential question about the ultimate basis of norms. Neither positivist descriptions nor a logic of norms can answer the questions, what is morally good, what is morally evil, and why? Yet this is precisely the "fundamental and ambitious task" which ethics has traditionally set for itself, a task which is still "one of the chief needs" of our day. The vital questions of moral good and evil require norms, not just descriptions, for an answer. Unfortunately, "ethics appears to have retired from its perennial and great task to the sidelines" (270).
Ethics cannot be reduced to a psychology or sociology of morals, since each of these sciences deals with morality only per accidens. Moreover, a "moral fact" is more than a psychophysical or social fact. Morality has a specificity which alone can provide the point of departure for a genuine science of morals. "Ethics is the science of morals par excellence," because it demonstrates "an empirical character, in that it proceeds from facts which, as a totality, constitute a fully singular reality" (272-73). "The point of departure for ethics is the experience of morality" (273). Wojtyla disagrees here with those who maintain that no differentiation is possible between moral phenomena and the rest of human life and activity. He maintains that there is an "experience of morality" sui generis which provides an experiential starting point for ethics, so long as one abandons the "blind alley" of radical empiricism. The task of ethics is to explore moral experience and thereby determine ultimate reasons for the facts to be found there. "The real method of ethics, therefore, is not deductive but reductive" (273). The Cardinal does not clarify what he means here by the distinction.
As the "starting point of science" and the "touchstone of realism," experience constitutes the basis for ethics. But how should one define experience? For the radical empiricist, the very concept of an "experience of morality" is meaningless. Moral good and evil have no "ontological status." The terms "good" and "evil" simply express the speaker's emotions. Wojtyla points to A. J. Ayer, Ch. Stevenson, and H. Reichenbach as exponents of this "emotivism," described by T. Geiger as "axiological nihilism" (276, n. 6). Experience, however, includes more than the sphere of "purely sensible impressions." The term "phenomenon" points to something that "appears," something that our intellectual faculties "perceive intuitively." Wojtyla regards such intuition as the "essence" of experience (275). If this is granted, "it is difficult to deny that morality 'appears' to us in a certain way, and that, thanks to this possibility, various moral facts can be experienced
We have intuitive access to moral facts" (276). It is evident here that the Cardinal has reconsidered his criticism of Scheler and reassessed the contribution that an analysis of phenomena can make to ethics.
Reality and Knowledge
The Cardinal draws attention to two elements or aspects of experience-"undetermined feelings" they could be called. The first, a "feeling of reality," with the accent on reality, is the feeling that something really exists objectively, independent from the observer. The second, a "feeling of knowledge," is a feeling of a peculiar relationship, a contact or union between the observer and that which exists objectively in its own right. Though these two feelings of reality and knowledge are distinct, they are organically united. We speak, on the one hand, of "the feeling of reality in and through knowledge" and, on the other hand, of "the feeling of knowledge on the basis of reality In such contact and relationship, the feeling of knowledge is ultimately revealed as a striving toward that which really and objectively exists, as a striving for its object, for truth" (277). The Cardinal does not explain here what exactly he means by "truth." He goes on to claim, however, that this perception of knowledge and reality radically overcomes the sensualist meaning of experience. There can be no "purely sensual" experience, because we are not "purely sensual" creatures (277).
"In the perception of knowledge, there exists as an essential, constitutive moment the peculiar need to strive for truth" (277). If reality were identical with knowledge, esse with per dpi (as idealists maintain), then the need to strive for truth in knowledge would be unintelligible. The need for such striving is explicable only on the basis of the transcendence of reality with respect to knowledge. Knowledge does not constitute reality but must go outside itself to be fulfilled. One aspect of that reality is morality. "The fact of experience reveals that [morality] is a particular reality, a particular esse" (278).
The Experience of Morality
Cardinal Wojtyla proceeds to make a distinction between "moral experience" and "the experience of morality." Moral experience arises out of the practice of morality, wherein we "witness" ourselves as the "authentic cause" of moral good and evil. Wojtyla insists here, as he had done earlier in his study of Scheler, that morality cannot be separated from causality. Derived from moral experience and rendering it more precise is the experience of morality, a secondary but deeper experience. Morality is both practiced and experienced; it is an externally visible fact with a basically inner character. We experience this subjectively in ourselves through introspection and in others through intersubjective perception and participation. Because we can intuit morality, ethics deals not only with the teaching of moral facts but with morality itself, as it is rooted in experience (282).
Because persons are both the subject and object of moral experiences, "the experience of morality is always contained in the experience of personhood and, to a certain extent, is even this experience itself' (283). We experience ourselves as persons through morality, and we experience morality through ourselves as persons. Morality and humanity are inseparable, as can be demonstrated by the fact that ethnologists do not investigate whether or not a morality existed among a primitive people but what specifically that morality was. "The experience of being a person is a necessary implication of the experience of morality" (284). Philosophical anthropology and ethics have always been closely associated. However, warns the Cardinal, morality should not be so identified with personhood as to resolve ethics into anthropology.
Moral Feeling
Wojtyla concludes his treatment of experience in ethics with a consideration of moral feeling or the "so-called moral sense." The concept of a moral sense rose in the wake of sensualist tendencies in anthropology and epistemology. Its classical exponent, David Hume, reduced morality to an innate sense which permits us to distinguish virtue from vice according to the pleasure that accompanies virtue and the pain that accompanies vice. Utilitarianism elevated the moral sense to a basic principle of ethics by maintaining that morality was concerned with the maximalization of pleasure and the minimalization of pain. In this, Wojtyla contends, utilitarianism was guilty of gross oversimplification.
We cannot deny that human acts, especially with respect to their moral evaluation, are accompanied by deep emotional experience, by joy and satisfaction in good and by depression and despair in evil. But reducing feelings to the category of sensible pleasure and pain is an impoverished view of a much more complex emotional structure. We are indebted to Max Scheler and twentieth-century phenomenologists for deepening our understanding of the psychology of morality. "It appears to be a great achievement of contemporary science that attention is being directed to the fact that emotional factors participate in the experience of morality" (287).
The concept of a "moral sense" can and should be preserved in the vocabulary of ethics, although Wojtyla expresses a preference here for the Polish term "feeling" or "sentiment" (poczucie, corresponding to the German Empfindung). He does not give an explanation for his preference, but it would appear that he wishes to emphasize the noncognitive, affective nature of moral sense. He admits that feelings are an important factor in moral experience, enjoying a directive significance in that they point to that which is specific in morality. That which is specific, however, is not apprehended by the senses but by "a certain intellectual intuition" (288).
"THE PROBLEM OF A THEORY OF MORALITY"
Having the thesis that ethics must have the "experience of morality" as its starting point, the Cardinal elaborates his metaethical theory with an analysis and interpretation ofthat experience in a second article, "The Problem of a Theory of Morality." A theory of morality, he states, constitutes a foundation of ethics by objectifying the dynamism of morality, "extracting from its subjective context what is always proper to the experience of morality" (224). Among the contents ofthat experience he first identifies moral value and explains its differentiation into moral good and evil as having its "basis and source" in norms. Moral norms do not derive from moral values, but values from norms. "A norm is not only the basis of moral value, it is the source for the split of the sphere we call 'moral value' into moral good and evil" (224). From where else, Wojtyla asks, would the distinction between moral good and evil come? We differentiate between veracity and falsehood on the basis of the norm that commands veracity and prohibits falsehood. Thus "a norm is a deeper and much more basic element of morality than value" (225).
Guilt
The Cardinal illustrates his theory with the example of guilt. "The experience of guilt in its essential contents is the experience of moral evil. It is evil contained in a conscious, free act, of which a person is the cause" (226). There is no guilt without conscious causality. "In the experience of guilt there is always included the causality of a personal Yes. If the objectification of moral value must adhere to experience, one cannot separate this value from act, or, more precisely, from the conscious causality of the person" (227). Wojtyla regards this as most important for defining moral value. "Moral value does not appear On the margin' of a human act or as a by-product of the act" (227). Rather, experience testifies to the fact that "moral value is realized in the act, within the dynamic structure that the act possesses as an actus personae" (227). As a consequence, "moral value Settles' in the person, as it were, taking root in him and becoming his own quality. This is perfectly demonstrated in the experience of guilt. As the agent of a morally evil act, a man becomes morally evil himself. Evil goes, as it were, from the act to the person" (227).
The experience of guilt, Wojtyla believes, points clearly to the dependence of value upon the principles of conscience and norms. "Conscience is nothing else than the experience of the principle of moral good and evil
Speaking generally, what we call a norm is a principle of moral good and evil" (228). The experience of guilt reveals a certain sovereignty of moral norms in the human person. "The experience of guilt includes not only conflict with the law but also conflict with conscience, which perceives and internalizes the fairness of the principle expressed by the law" (228). The fairness of the law stands in opposition to the act performed, both judging and accusing the agent. The conflict is painful but productive and human.
The Cardinal proceeds to interpret the experience of morality by naming and analyzing its constituent elements. "The scientific method requires steps that are thought through. Rigor and certitude depend on it" (229). He sets about a "controlled reflection" of the terms "moral value" and "duty."
Moral Value "Value" belongs to the category of quality: by virtue of their "moral value," both human acts and the agents who perform them demonstrate their "proper quality" as good or evil, virtuous or sinful. Moral value includes the concept of moral evil as well as moral good. Though some moral philosophers prefer to distinguish between values and disvalues or negative values, Wojtyla finds the distinction artificial and not corresponding to the experience of morality (230). Moral evil, he explains, consists not only, nor even above all, of a contradiction of the good, but rather of a conflict with the moral principles of conscience and norms. Both the agent and the act must be related to norms. To neglect doing so is to fall into the error of separating one's psychic and psychophysical functions from the whole human person. Such psychologism gives rise to idealistic subjectivism and positivism in moral interpretation. When a person is seen simply as a "consciousness," there is no other possibility than "subjectivizing" moral good and evil.
This "subjective" understanding of moral value is replaced by the Cardinal with one he regards as more objective. "A proper and adequate interpretation is one which conceives of moral value on the basis of man's being and becoming (esse-fieri) through his acts. Through his acts a man becomes morally good or evil depending on whether or not his acts are morally good or evil" (232). For the phenomenologist, a moral value is immediate and self-evident, a Wertschau. It is "something original and cannot be subsumed under some other more encompassing category" (233). Moral value, whether good or evil, is the "content of an intuition recognizing with immediate clarity ... that moral good is that through which man as man becomes good, and moral evil is that through which man as man becomes evil" (233-34). This is a rather commonplace, prescientific understanding of moral good and evil, Wojtyla admits, but the role of science is not necessarily to make known in this instance that which was hidden, but to verify and define more precisely what is a common understanding.
In proposing that moral value is that through which "man as man" becomes good or evil, the Cardinal acknowledges that he is equating moral value with "humanity." A person's humanity "is the one and only key to understanding these values and the only possible foundation for explaining them
We cannot interpret moral values or morality without humanity, nor humanity as such without morality. Morality constitutes the necessary key to understanding [humanity]" (234-35). Wojtyla allows for the possibility of adding a teleological interpretation to this personalist understanding of moral good and evil. Moral goodness contributes toward the full realization of both the act and the agent. An acting person is fulfilled through moral good and left unfulfilled through moral evil (238).
Duty
Duty is an "integral element" of morality. In fact, "to some extent, duty is more decisive for morality than value." It "denotes that constitutivum of experience, to which we attribute a moral character in the proper sense of the word" (240). For Wojtyla, "I want or do not want to be good" constitutes the "very essence of morality." If I want to be good, it is necessary that I behave in a particular way. Thus duty is connected to the self-realization of one's being as a person (240-41).
At the basis of the experience of duty, one can perceive the potentiality of freedom, since a being deprived of freedom would be incapable of experiencing duty. Furthermore, the experience of "I must" as opposed to "I want" reveals our spirituality as persons. It takes us across the threshold between the relative and the absolute. Not the absolute in an ontological sense, since that, for Wojtyla, would be ontologism. Thé absolute which corresponds to moral duty (Kant's categorical imperative) arises from the opposition between good and evil, whereby they mutually exclude each other (241-42).
Implications
The Cardinal concludes by drawing some implications from this theory for anthropology and axiology. "The reality of morality, especially duty, indicates that at the basis of morality one finds man as a person" (243). Personhood is in correlation to morality and cannot be supplanted by any other more general concept. No society or nation, no government or social class can take the place of the person as the subject and center of morality. "Through this aspect man stands as a person above the world, as it were" (244). It is a position as incommunicable and inalienable as personhood itself. Social morality cannot replace the centrality of personhood but can only enrich it. Thanks to persons, the world is transformed by being humanized. "The proper measure of the greatness of every human being is contained in morality" (245).
Besides human greatness, the Cardinal sees his theory of morality as pointing to the contingency of human existence. If moral good is fulfilment, moral evil is nonfulfilment or nonexistence. There is no ontic necessity for our existence. "Man experiences the absoluteness of good and thus encounters the aspect of the absolute in himself, at the same time not being absolute himself. Thus he constantly oscillates between the possibility of good and evil" (246). Because we experience our contingency relative to the absolute, morality is bound by deep ties to religion (247).
A final implication of this theory of morality pertains to axiology. The philosophy of being, which identifies objective good with being, has come to be replaced by a philosophy of consciousness in which good and evil are described as qualities of consciousness. The Cardinal believes that his theory of morality overcomes the dichotomy between these two philosophical orientations. A human being is a conscious being. As being and consciousness cannot be divided in a person, so are they inseparable as aspects of a theory of morality. Any effort to disjoin them can only result in absolutizing one or the other (249).
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
The issues which Cardinal Wojtyla addresses in his metaethics are so many and complex that anything like an extensive evaluation is neces-sarily precluded. A few selective comments and questions may be appropriate, however, together with an expression of high regard. One cannot help but admire a philosophical endeavor of such intricate subtlety from a man who, as cardinal archbishop of Krakow, was necessarily taken up with the multifarious duties of a pastor and administrator. Though it is apparent that Thomas Aquinas, Kant, and Scheler all made an impact on Wojtyla, it is obvious too that he appropriated their thinking critically and creatively. He has produced a theory of morality that is marked by traits of intellectual vigor and originality. Catholic moralists may be surprised that the Pope has devoted so much thought to so central and critical an issue for moral thinking today as the foundation of norms.
Given the historical and cultural situation in which Karol Wojtyla found himself, one can well appreciate why he opposed empiricism and refused to accept impartial descriptions of human behavior as the sum total of ethics. In the aftermath of World War II and the Nazi occupation of Poland, he could hardly consent to the "axiological nihilism" that results from identifying morality with the emotions. This difficulty in understanding and evaluating the Cardinal's metaethics is compounded by the fact that he rarely makes use of standard critical apparatus. There are almost no references to the origin of his thought and no illustrations of its full implications for concrete ethical situations. This high degree of abstraction, coupled with several extremely fine distinctions (a reductive method as opposed to one that is deductive; the experience of morality as distinct from moral experience), renders his moral philosophy arduous and often obscure. The Cardinal is never quite clear, for example, as to what he means by ethics as a "science" or by terms like "truth" or "norms."
Wojtyla's attempt to prove that ethics is a science may well pose some questions for moralists who do not share his phenomenological orientation. Certainly ethics is a science inasmuch as its practitioners are expected to proceed methodically, analyzing, organizing, and interpreting data gleaned from experience. Certainly its goal is objectivity, in the sense of being radically based in reference to reality. But this does not mean that ethics can enjoy an objectivity that is absolute and exclusive of reference to a subject. Critics of empiricism more recent than Husserl (M. Polanyi, for example) point out that even in the natural and physical sciences total objectivity is an impossibility. The "impartial observer" is unattainable in any science. All knowledge, including that of the natural, physical sciences, is personal and relational (which is not to say utterly relative). Truth can no longer be seen simply as a correspondence of the intellect to a reality "out there," since there is no way to transcend the relationship between the intellect and reality and objectively determine that correspondence. Truth, rather, needs to be recognized as the result of a continuing process whereby we develop an ever more adequate and productive relationship with reality. Perhaps the greatest single difficulty with Karol Wojtyla's moral philosophy is the fact that it is incomplete. These two articles give an indication of being the first two chapters of a book-length study similar to his anthropology in The Acting Person. Chapter 3 appears never to have been written, or at least has not been published. As it stands, the Cardinal's metaethics leaves many questions unanswered. The conse quent ambiguity leaves his theory open to the possibility that concepts like intrinsically evil actions and negative moral absolutes fit in quite neatly.
Even in its present, unfinished state, however, the metaethics of Pope John Paul II constitutes an invitation to Catholic moral philosophers and theologians to give more serious consideration to the contribution which phenomenology can make to ethics. Phenomenological analysis and in terpretation of experience may not be able to elicit absolute certitude or transform ethics into a rigorous science any more than empirical data can. But it may well aid in attaining moral certitude and thereby advance the science and art that is ethical inquiry. His pioneering efforts in metaethics make Pope John Paul II an interesting and notable contrib utor to that important enterprise.
